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Abstract
Sri Lanka’s civil war lasted almost 26 years
and cost tens of thousands of lives. Since the
end of the war in 2009, several thousand
asylum seekers from Sri Lanka have sought
protection in Australia, but both Labor and
Liberal/National Coalition governments have
taken a restrictive approach to their arrival
and have expressed support for the Sri Lankan
government. This article explores Australia’s
response to the protection needs of Sri Lankans
during an earlier era, at the outbreak of the
war in 1983, when a Labor government
processed Tamils ‘in-country’ under
Australia’s Special Humanitarian Program.
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1. Introduction
The Black July riots in 1983 started a civil war
in Sri Lanka that lasted 26 years and resulted
in thedeaths of anestimated80–100,000people
(ABC 2009). Following the end of the conflict,
approximately 4,500 Sri Lankan asylum
seekers arrived in Australia by boat between
2009 and 2013 (DIAC 2009, 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013; DIBP 2014). By 2012, Australia’s
Labor government had instituted a policy of
quick ‘enhanced screening’ for Sri Lankan
arrivals (AHRC2013), andMinister forForeign
Affairs and Trade, Senator Bob Carr, argued a
year later that there was no evidence that
‘Tamils live in fear andarefleeing their country’
(Carr cited in Ewart 2013). This was despite
reports of human rights abuses in Sri Lanka
during and after the war, from the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, and the International Bar Association,
that have detailed cases of the Sri Lankan
authorities’ use of rape and sexual violence as
ameans of torture, the torture of Tamil civilians
and government-sanctioned abuse of journalists,
judges and opposition politicians (Alberici
2013; Amnesty International 2013; Human
Rights Watch 2013; International Bar
Association 2013; Jupp 2013; Renshaw 2013;
United Nations 2015). Since 2013, Australia’s
Liberal/National Coalition government has
intercepted Sri Lankans at sea and returned them
to their government (Kaldor Centre 2016b).
The civil war’s beginning in 1983 and its
end in 2009 coincidedwith Labor governments
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in Australia, but the response by the Hawke
government in 1983 was markedly different
from that of the Rudd and Gillard governments
in the late 2000s. In 1983, Australia chose to
process applications for resettlement on
humanitarian grounds ‘in-country’. This paper
draws on archival documents from the
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
publications of the Australian Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs to examine
how Australia admitted Sri Lankans under the
in-country Special Humanitarian Program
(SHP) if they had a family sponsorship in
Australia and could prove they had been
adversely affected by the outbreak of
communal violence in Sri Lanka in July and
August 1983.
Australia’s use of processing within Sri
Lanka has not been explored until now. This
is because the in-country program operated
relatively discreetly, and evidence suggests it
operated on a limited scale. But unearthing
the details of this program offers new insights
into Australian refugee policy history. The
program demonstrates the respective agendas
of the departments of Foreign Affairs and
Immigration concerning the degree to which
refugee policy ought to be subjected to foreign
policy interests and also illuminates the
broader domestic imperatives that shaped
refugee policy. Immigration used the program
to carefully respond to lobbying by Sinhalese
and Tamil communities in Australia while still
managing the sensitivities of the bilateral
relationship with Sri Lanka, because it framed
the criteria for resettlement around those who
had been ‘adversely affected by the violence’.
On the face of it, therefore, this precluded
Australia from favouring the resettlement of
one group over another, but the nature of the
violence meant that, in reality, Tamils were
likely to be successful applicants.
2. Australia’s Special Humanitarian
Program
In 1981 the Australian government established
the SHP, a specific stream of the migration
program intended for personswhowere in need
of protection but who fell outside the definition
of refugee set out under Article 1(A)(2) of the
1951 Refugee Convention. The SHP was
intended to provide flexibility in Australia’s
response to protection needs around the world,
operating alongside the annual refugee intake.
In Parliament, the Minister for Immigration in
the Liberal/National Fraser government, Ian
Macphee, then said the SHP was a means of
providing ‘sympathetic consideration’ for
those ineligible under the normal migration
criteria or the strict Convention definition,
‘quasi-refugees with close relatives or ties
in Australia’ (Australia. Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates 1981). These persons
would be subject to ‘substantial discrimination
or human rights violations’ and would have no
comparable claim to resettlement elsewhere.
While not specified at the time, the SHP
provided the means through which applicants
could be processed within their country of
origin. It was this program that Stewart West,
a subsequent Minister for Immigration in the
Hawke Labor government, implemented in
response to the Sri Lankan communal violence
of July 1983. By this time, the SHP had been
used to resettle former political prisoners and
dissidents directly out of Poland and was being
implemented in El Salvador and Chile
(Department of Immigration 1983; Higgins
2014). It was a form of processing that has
been used at various times over the past three
decades on a small scale by governments in
Australia, Canada and Europe, and on a larger
scale by the United States, to respond to
specific refugee-like situations. The most direct
reference in Australian government
publications stems from a 1991 review of
Australia’s refugee policy, which states the
following:
The SHP… enabled Australia to operate outside
its restrictive migration programs, accepting
people such as ‘in-country refugees’ in Poland, El
Salvador, Chile, Lebanon and Sri Lanka (the only
countries so designated), and others outside their
country of usual residence and experiencing or
fearing gross discrimination but not persecution’
(Australia. National Population Council 1991).
In addition to providing Australia with a more
flexible mechanism with which to provide
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humanitarian protection, the SHP was also the
means of geographically diversifying
Australia’s humanitarian program, following
the introduction of non-racially discriminatory
immigration policy in the early 1970s, and then
a subsequent large-scale resettlement of
Indochinese refugees. The SHP facilitated a
global focus for Australia’s humanitarian
program, beyond long-standing refugee source
countries in the Soviet bloc and the recent
intake from Indochina, and towards those
fleeing human rights violations in other parts
of the world (Higgins 2014). It is arguable that
Australia’s response to the plight of Tamils in
1983 was partly shaped by this new focus.
As a result of these changes, however, the
SHP became a site of tensions between Foreign
Affairs and Immigration. When refugee policy
had been formalised in May 1977 by the
Coalition government of Malcolm Fraser, it
was designated to be the responsibility of
Immigration, with input from Foreign Affairs.
The Department of Immigration operated with
awareness that for Foreign Affairs,
applications for refugee status were of
‘paramount foreign policy significance’, and
the priority was ‘not to take refugees where it
would offend a source country’ (A446 1982/
95192 Part 2). During the early 1980s, the
two departments disagreed over the extent to
which Foreign Affairs could assert foreign
policy considerations over the direction of
Australia’s growing refugee program (Higgins
2014). In 1982, when the terms of the SHP
were being formalised by Immigration,
Foreign Affairs expressed concern that the
program could be seen by potential source
country governments as hostile—an explicit
criticism of their relationship with their people
(A1838 1632/5/23 Part 2)—and wished for
Immigration to avoid publicity around
individual SHP cases or programs. Foreign
Affairs requested that its own senior officials
be able to review any individual SHP
applications that may have implications for
the bilateral relationship between Australia
and the country-of-origin (A1838 1632/5/23
Part 2).
The SHP also had practical administrative
implications that concerned both Immigration
and Foreign Affairs. It was a Foreign Affairs
responsibility to provide advice on the political
and social conditions in countries of origin; the
likely response of the government of the
country of origin to an SHP; and the terms of
any announcement of a special program. It
was an Immigration responsibility to manage
the policy process in consultation with Foreign
Affairs, to interview individuals and make
decisions about eligibility. However, these
administrative exchanges were at times a site
of tension between the two departments, with
conflict arising over responsibilities for
refugee and human rights reporting and
consequently staffing at overseas missions,
including Geneva, and liaison with the
UNHCR (A1838 932/29/1 Part 4; A1838
1632/5/23 Part 2).
3. The Outbreak of Sri Lanka’s Civil War
as Recorded by Foreign Affairs
3.1. Sri Lanka Before the Civil War
The Tamil population had been subject to
discrimination and occasional violence since
Sri Lankan independence in 1948. Under
colonial rule, the British had hired and
favoured the Tamils, building excellent
missionary schools in the north, with the effect
that Tamils often had a greater facility in
English and were over-represented in
government jobs. When the British left the
country, they left a model of democracy that
paid no special attention to the rights of
minorities and with English as the official
language. In 1956, however, the passage of
the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956,
which became known as the ‘Sinhala Only
Act’, replaced English with Sinhala as the
language of government and education. Seen
by supporters as a demonstration of
independence from their colonial masters, the
Act effectively barred Sri Lanka’s non-
Sinhala-speaking minorities (including
Tamils) from employment within the public
service. According to the 1953 census, the
‘Sri Lankan’ Tamils, who had lived in Sri
Lanka for 2–3,000 years, constituted almost
11 per cent of the population at the time, while
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the so-called Indian Tamils, who had been
brought to Sri Lanka in the 19th Century by
the British to work in tea, coffee and rubber
plantations, constituted 12 per cent of the
population (CICRED series, 1974). Much of
the ‘Sri Lankan’ Tamil population lived in the
north and east of the country, while a number
of Tamils lived in Colombo, including
professionals and business owners (CICRED,
1974). The Indian Tamils tended to live in the
centre of the island close to the plantations
and employment (CICRED series, 1974).
While some of the restrictions on Tamils’
access to education and government
employment were eased over time, the
‘Sinhala Only’ Act left a legacy of bitterness,
which gave rise to periodic violence and
nurtured the creation of both Tamil and
Sinhalese extremist groups. A number of
Tamil groups, including the Tamil Tigers (the
Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam, LTTE)
and the more moderate Tamil United
Liberation Front political party, formed out of
a desire for the protection of a Tamil homeland.
Hyndman (1992) has detailed an escalation of
tit-for-tat violence between the LTTE and
military or police, reprisal attacks on the
civilian population, thuggery and a diminished
rule of law. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of
1978 gave sweeping powers to police to
search, arrest and detain anyone suspected not
only of terrorist activity but also of activities
seen as supporting the terrorist cause.
According to Hyndman, although the
legislation was ‘general in its wording’, for
many years, it was ‘directed almost exclusively
at young Tamil males’ (Hyndman 1992). There
were harsh penalties for persons connected
with or believed to be connected with any
unlawful activity, such as putting up posters
or harbouring a ‘terrorist’ overnight, including
detention without charge for successive
3 month periods up to a maximum of
18 months (Hyndman 1987). The Australian
High Commission in Colombo reported that
the Sri Lankan Director of Criminal
Investigation, Snr Superintendent M.D.A.
Rajapaksa, had advised that emergency
regulations enabled security forces operating
in the north of Sri Lanka to bury or cremate
bodies in secret without an inquest or post-
mortem (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1). While the
Sri Lankan government publicised the deaths
of members of the security forces, the numbers
of Tamil civilians killed in reprisals remains
unknown.
3.2. Black July and the Beginning of the Civil
War
In late July 1983, Colombo erupted into
violence. While race riots were a periodic
occurrence in Sri Lanka (there were anti-Tamil
riots in 1956, 1958, 1977 and 1981), the July
1983 riots have been described as a ‘pogrom’
and have since been referred to as ‘Black July’
(Weiss 2012). Over a period of 7 days, anti-
Tamil rioters burned and looted Tamil homes
and killed an estimated 4,000 Tamils, leading
to a civil war that lasted 26 years. Thousands
were injured and 200,000 were displaced as
their homes and businesses were destroyed.
Sparked by the LTTE’s killing of 13 soldiers
in the north (itself a reprisal for the claimed
rape of two Tamil schoolgirls), the riot began
in Colombo and spread to other parts of the
island. The Tamils targeted were the so-called
Sri Lankan Tamils, who were predominant in
professions and in the bureaucracy.
Australian government archival records
constitute a rich source of evidence on these
incidents. Reports from the Australian High
Commission suggested that the violence was
not spontaneous but organised, with rioters in
possession of lists of Tamil-owned houses
and businesses; indeed, the archives show that
some SHP applicants suggested that these lists
were electoral rolls (a fact that was later
substantiated in a UN report) (A1838, 1690/1/
18 Part 1; United Nations 2011). Many rioters
appeared to have been transported in
government-owned buses. In streets where
Tamils lived, only those homes owned by
Tamils were burned down, sometimes with
their occupants inside, while Tamils living in
Sinhala-owned houses were dragged out and
bashed while their houses were spared
(A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1). An embassy report
described a staff member seeing someone set
alight in the street (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1,
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1981). The rioters appeared to act with
impunity, burning and bashing in full view of
police who did not intervene (A1838, 1690/1/
18 Part 1). It was believed that many of the
mobs were led by people with connections to
the ruling United National Party (A1838,
1690/1/18 Part 1). Displaced Tamils were
transported by sea to Jaffna in the north,
ostensibly for their own safety, while what
was left of their properties was confiscated by
the state, and according to the Australian
Embassy in Washington, ‘virtually all Tamil-
owned property in Colombo [was] burned to
the ground’ (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1). In
subsequent days, the violence spread to other
cities, while in Welikada maximum security
prison, 52 Tamil political prisoners were
brutally murdered in two separate incidents
(Hyndman 1987).
It took President Jayawardene 4 days to
address the nation, and when he did, he blamed
the violence on Tamil demands for a separate
state:
Because of this violence by the terrorists, the
Sinhalese people themselves have reacted. I feel
that the movement for separation should have
been banned long, long ago. (Jayawardene 1983).
The President announced new provisions that
would strip the civil rights of anyone
advocating a separate state, including the
Tamil United Liberation Front, which
represented Tamils in the Parliament:
I cannot see, and my government cannot see, any
other way by which we can appease the natural
desire and request of the Sinhala people to
prevent the country being divided (Jayawardene
1983).
Behind the scenes, Australian authorities took
a different view. In reporting from the post,
the Australian High Commissioner in
Colombo suggested that ‘the fact that wealthy
Tamils with goodUNP (United National Party)
connections have not been spared suggests that
there has been a deliberate attempt to destroy
the economic strength and influence of the
Colombo Tamils [(Sri Lankan Tamils living
in Colombo)…and that] elements close to the
government may themselves have played a
significant role in the events of the past few
days’ (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1). As Hyndman
has noted, the Sri Lankan government failed to
commission any kind of enquiry into the events
of ‘Black July’ or to prosecute those
responsible (Hyndman 1987).
3.3. Flight of Refugees from Sri Lanka
The outbreak of communal violence in July
1983 and a deteriorating level of security and
violence thereafter led to the ‘weakening of
the authority of the rule of law’, an ‘erosion
of democratic values’ and ‘increasing racial
antagonism’ in which violence committed by
both the LTTE and by forces allied with the
government escalated (Hyndman 1985). Over
the next few years, 106,000 Sri Lankans
claimed asylum in Europe, constituting the
fourth largest country of origin for total asylum
applicants on that continent (UNHCR 2001).
While there had been a small number of
claimants before the conflict began in 1983,
the number increased substantially after this
point. According to Koser and Van Hear, by
the 1990s, up to 300,000 Sri Lankan refugees
joined existing diasporas of economicmigrants
from Sri Lanka in North America and Europe
(Koser and Van Hear 2003). Sri Lankans
constituted one of the largest—if not the
largest—groups of asylum applicants in
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom
during that decade (UNHCR 2001). Later,
during the years immediately before and after
the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lanka
was consistently represented among the top
14 countries of origin for asylum seekers
(UNHCR 2013b).
During the early 1980s, Australian
authorities were paying close attention to the
increasing number of Tamil asylum seekers
around the world. In the lead-up to the events
of July 1983, there was a surge of young Tamil
men arriving in Canada and West Germany
applying for refugee status. On 6 July 1983,
the Australian High Commission in Colombo
cabled Canberra to advise that the Canadian
government was considering introducing visa
requirements to discourage Sri Lankan Tamils
from seeking refugee status (A1838, 1690/1/
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18 Part 1). During the first 4 months of 1983,
the Canadian government’s Refugee Status
Committee had approved 7 out of 30 Tamil
applications and there was concern that
successful claims might ‘encourage more to
try their luck in Canada’ (A1838, 1690/1/18
Part 1). Soon after the events in Colombo,
Canada introduced ‘Special Measures’ for Sri
Lankans, making it easier for some Sri
Lankans to remain in Canada, while imposing
a visa requirement on those who wished to
enter the country (Kelley and Trebilcock
2010; Hathaway 1988). While the Canadians
were reported to have been assured by Sri
Lankan authorities that there was no political
harassment involved, the West Germans had
reached an agreement with the Sri Lankan
government for the repatriation of ‘any
northern terrorist found to have sought political
asylum in West Germany’ (A1838, 1690/1/18
Part 1).
Foreign Affairs’ internal memos suggest
that before the war, in the early 1980s, officers
of the department largely accepted the Sri
Lankan government’s framing of Tamil
grievances as ‘fundamentally economic’ in
nature and of the ‘terrorist’ threat posed by
Tamils. This was despite ongoing reports of
the harassment of Tamils and an estimate,
based on advice from the Sri Lankan security
services in August 1982, of a hard core Tiger
membership split between two hostile factions
of between just 45 and 60 members (A1838,
1690/1/18 Part 1). Reports from the Australian
High Commission in Colombo described a
history of the Sri Lankan army and police
responding to terrorist acts by harassing
numbers of Tamil youth who were treated
badly, some incarcerated for long periods of
time often without their families knowing their
whereabouts. But on 6 July 1983, a memo
from the Australian mission in Colombo
enclosed an article on asylum seekers from
the pro-government local paper, The Island,
and suggested that ‘though grossly
overwritten and giving only one side of the
story, [the article] nevertheless points rightly
to the possibilities for the pursuit of ‘bogus’
[refugee] claims and essentially “commercial”
objectives inherent in the current situation’
(A1838, 1690/1/18 part 1). And other
governments were also wary of Tamil claims.
On 4 April 1983, the High Commission
cabled Canberra to advise that
Our impression is that, to date, most Sri Lankan
Tamil applicants for refugee status overseas have
denied any association with ‘terrorist’ groups,
claiming instead to be victims (on ethnic grounds
and perhaps on suspicion of ‘terrorist’
involvement) of indiscriminate harassment,
arbitrary detention and/or physical abuse by
police/members of the armed forces. The
experience of other governments suggests that the
authenticity of documentation produced as
evidence of victimisation by refugee applicants
warrants careful examination as forgeries have
been detected (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1).
By this point, only a tiny number of Sri
Lankans had claimed asylum in Australia
(Higgins 2016). Two applicants were
considered by Australia’s Determination of
Refugee Status Committee in July 1982, a year
before the events in Colombo. One of the
applicants was a Tamil Tigers fighter. The
records indicate that the plight of Tamil asylum
seekers was an unfamiliar area for Australian
decision-makers, and these cases were deferred
for further inquiries. A third applicant was
considered by the Committee in March 1983
and granted refugee status on the grounds that
the individual was considered likely to be
singled out on the grounds of race and political
opinion if returned to Sri Lanka.
Hyndman noted in a 1987 study that given
the discriminatory application of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act and the massacre
of Tamil political detainees in July 1983,
among other factors, ‘it would seem that many
Sri Lankan Tamil applicants for refugee status
would be able to establish that, should they
be returned to Sri Lanka, they would have
good reason to fear persecution within the
meaning of the Convention’ (Hyndman
1987). The number of Sri Lankans claiming
refugee status in Australia increased during
the mid to late 1980s (A1838 932/22 Part 1),
and although the number of those Sri Lankan
claimants who were approved or rejected by
the Committee for this period is not published,
individual case files suggest that the
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Committee viewed rejected cases with a degree
of sympathy (A463 1987/765 Part 1; A463
1987/765 Part 2). It is possible that some were
allowed to remain in Australia on
compassionate grounds under Section 6a(1)
(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or were
allowed to remain for an extra 2 weeks under
a special ‘policy on Sri Lankans’ that
Immigration adopted, allowing UNHCR the
opportunity to review the rejected claim
(A1838 932/22 Part 1; D399 S1985/030156).
4. Australia’s in-Country Program in
Sri Lanka
On 29 July 1983, ‘in the light of the growing
inter-communal tension and violence in Sri
Lanka’, Stewart West, Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, instructed his
department to
• expedite consideration of sponsorship
applications already lodged by people in
Australia for the entry of their relatives or
where Australian residents wished to
sponsor relatives who had been adversely
affected by civil disturbances;
• draw to his attention any situations where it
appeared that family migration would not
be approved, so that the application might
be considered under Australia’s Special
Humanitarian Program; and
• favourably consider any applications by Sri
Lankans presently in Australia as visitors or
temporary residents to extend visas up until
the end of September 1983 in the first
instance (This period was later extended.)
(Australia. Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs 1983)
Under the SHP, ‘close relatives’ included
uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, first cousins,
grandparents and grandchildren. If no such
relationship existed, then an applicant needed
to ‘have some claim on Australia, e.g. former
student or resident, former employee of an
Australian firm or diplomatic mission’ and
have been affected by the communal violence
(A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 4). The family
relationships were therefore relatively broad,
and the reason for this is not specified in the
documents. Importantly, there is no indication
that applicants were prioritised according to
the characteristic of their connection with
Australia. The SHP today operates slightly
differently. Under the Global Special
Humanitarian Program (visa sub-class 202),
family links are defined closely: applicants
who have a partner, dependent child, parent
or sibling in Australia receive first priority,
while applicants who have an extended family
member in Australia (such as grandparents,
aunt, uncle, niece, nephew or cousin) receive
second-order priority. The ability of friends,
distant relative or organisations to sponsor
applicants remains in place, but these receive
third priority (DIBP 2015). Under the In-
Country Special Humanitarian visa (sub-class
201), an applicant may self-refer or be
proposed by an immediate family member in
Australia.
Under the program as announced by
Minister West, Sri Lankans who were resident
in Australia had to lodge a sponsorship
application form in Australia nominating a
relative or other individual in Sri Lanka, and
Immigration would determine that if that
nominated person was not eligible for normal
migration entry or family reunion, they would
be considered under the SHP. The preliminary
eligibility check was performed in Australia,
and then, the Australian High Commission
would contact that nominated person in Sri
Lanka and invite them to attend an interview
at the diplomatic post in Colombo on a
particular date and time. In keeping with the
terms for the SHP listed above, that individual
would have to demonstrate that they had been
adversely affected by the violence (A1838,
1690/1/18 Part 4). It is not clear whether ‘the
violence’ in this case extended past the
communal conflict of July and August 1983;
the Immigration annual report of 1984 stated
that while ‘the special concessions for family
migration’were rescinded in January that year,
‘eligible applicants continue to be considered
under the SHP, although sponsorships have
dropped markedly’ (DIEA 1984).
Initially announced as a short-term
mechanism, it is unclear exactly when the
SHP was last employed ‘in-country’ for Sri
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Lankans, although evidence suggests that so-
called special measures for Sri Lankans under
the SHP were discontinued in June 1988
(DIEA 1988). The program contributed to the
admission of 720 people over the first 2 years:
297 in 1983/1984 and 423 in 1984/1985, and
potentially smaller numbers in subsequent
years (DIEA 1986). In 1985, Immigration
reported that ‘the number of sponsorships
received following the communal violence of
July and August 1983 continued to decline in
1984-85’ (DIEA 1985). The exact number of
Sri Lankans processed ‘in-country’, as distinct
from the SHP more broadly, is not specified in
the records.
The in-country SHP in Sri Lanka operated
slightly differently from the other in-country
programs that Australia was running in El
Salvador and Chile at that same time. First,
generally speaking eligibility under the Latin
American programs was not solely based
around a single event or time period; rather,
entry was granted to those who suffered
serious discrimination or human rights
violations at the hands of authorities or para-
military groups, although the Australian
government did work to resettle specific
groups of amnestied political prisoners in El
Salvador and trade unionists who had been
internally displaced in Chile. Second, at times,
Australian officials working in Latin America
had to liaise with intermediaries, such as the
Catholic Church or other non-governmental
organisations, in order to identify prospective
applicants. There is no evidence that officials
had to do the same in Sri Lanka, as sponsorship
applications were lodged in Australia.
4.1. Foreign Policy Interests and Domestic
Considerations
The Australian government’s immigration
response to the events of Black July, though
measured, was apparently more generous than
some officials in the Department of Foreign
Affairs would have advised. A subsequent
cable from Foreign Affairs Canberra to the
Australian High Commission in Colombo (21
July 1983, A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1) sent as
the communal violence in Sri Lanka escalated
conveyed the Minister for Foreign Affairs Bill
Hayden’s desire to meet with the Sri Lankan
High Commissioner to discuss the Tamil
situation. The cable expressed Foreign Affairs
concerns at the Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs, Stewart West’s, proposal to
make a number of places available to Tamils
under the SHP. The Australian post in
Colombo was asked to comment on ‘the
suggestion by Mr Hayden of the need for a
formal, strong expression of concern’ to the
Sri Lankan government (A1838, 1690/1/18
Part 1):
Such a statement, we assume, would have to
balance actions and aims of the Tamil extremists,
the severity of measures taken under the
prevention of Terrorism Act, the basic difficulties
of the communal problem, and the generally
sound human rights record of the Sri Lanka
Government over the years (A1838, 1690/1/18
Part 1) (emphasis added).
Foreign Affairs officials took pains to avoid the
appearance of the Australian government
supporting the Tamils and counselled that any
public announcement of the extension of the
SHP—as a result of the communal violence
—should not refer to Tamils, but rather to
‘any Sri Lankan adversely affected by the
community violence’: this despite the obvious
targeting of Tamils in the violence. The ‘Tamil
question’ had not been an issue in the
Australia/Sri Lanka relationship, and Foreign
Affairs had no desire for it to become one.
Officials felt there was a ‘risk that Australia
[would] be seen as supporting other Tamil
demands’ and that it was in Foreign Affairs’
‘interests to encourage [Immigration] to select
applicants from all minority groups’ (A1838,
1690/1/18 Part 3).
The efforts to avoid the appearance of
favouritism were also motivated by domestic
concerns. Immigration customarily insisted
that the direction of the humanitarian program
had to take into account the demands and
interests of the Australian community. Foreign
Affairs agreed, expressing the view that the
SHP intake should not have a disproportionate
number of ‘one ethnic group over another,
because of the need for a balanced
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representation in the Sri Lankan community in
Australia’ (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 1). The
position led to representations from Tamil
groups in Australia, unhappy at a perception
that Sinhalese were being advantaged under
SHP provisions, while Sinhalese groups in
Australia complained that Tamils were being
advantaged. Publicly 2 years later,
Immigration held that it did not know how
many Sinhalese and Tamils had been resettled
in Australia under the SHP, because ‘in line
with the government’s non-discriminatory
immigration policy, no record is kept of ethnic,
religious or racial backgrounds’ (Australia.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1986).
In private at the time, the fact that the SHP
was not a refugee program was a distinct
semantic benefit for Foreign Affairs and
Immigration officials, who carefully argued to
representatives from the ethnic communities
that although Australia was providing more
resettlement places for Sri Lankans as a direct
response to the inter-communal violence, this
did not constitute an acknowledgement of a
‘refugee’ situation as such (A1838, 1690/1/18
Part 3).
There were, however, differences between
Foreign Affairs and Immigration as to the
extent to which the SHP should be used as a
foreign policy tool. In February 1984, when
the UN Committee for Human Rights was
sitting in Geneva, the Australian High
Commission in Colombo suggested that
Australia might offer suspension of the SHP
as a means of showing support for President
Jayewardene’s ‘conciliatory efforts’ in
convening an all-party conference with
political opponents in Sri Lanka. The High
Commission suggested that Australia
use the Special Humanitarian Program as a
vehicle to express the fact that we are still
concerned about the security of minorities [in Sri
Lanka]. This could either take the form of a
statement suspending the program and supporting
the all-party conference (so as not to give the
impression of undermining it while it is still in
progress) or alternatively a statement signaling
our determination to continue SHP nominations
until a satisfactory solution to the problem has
been reached (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 5).
The head of the Refugees Branch in
Immigration responded with the view that
‘we do not see the use or otherwise of the
Special Humanitarian Program as a viable
option to be considered for achieving the stated
objective’ (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 5). It was
argued that using the SHP as a diplomatic tool
would undermine the global nature of SHP
criteria and run the risk of ‘singling out Sri
Lankans for discriminatory treatment’. In any
case, Immigration sought to argue that the
‘SHP is unlikely to be interpreted as a
comment on the human rights performance of
the Sri Lankan authorities’ because it was
limited to family sponsorship (A1838, 1690/
1/18 Part 1).
This debate over the manner in which source
country governments would interpret the SHP
had been an ongoing source of disagreement
between the two departments since the
previous year, when the SHP had been initially
used to accept entrants from countries of first
asylum in the Middle East and Europe. The
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
believed that because the SHP was not a
refugee program, it could not constitute a
statement that a source country was refugee-
producing, an argument that Foreign Affairs
disputed (A1838 1632/5/23 Part 2).
Ultimately, however, it appears that any
sensitivities that may have arisen between
Australia and the Jayewardene government
over the resettlement of Sri Lankans on
humanitarian grounds were managed
successfully (A1838, 1690/1/18 Part 5).
5. Conclusion
The differences in the responses of the Hawke
government in 1983 and the Rudd and Gillard
governments in the late 2000s can be attributed
to two factors. First, while the size and
composition of the immigration program was
a simmering political issue in 1983, only a
small number of asylum seekers were arriving
in Australia at that point and there were no
maritime arrivals (as compared with the period
1976 to 1981). Australia’s response to those
Sri Lankans in need of protection was
therefore an attempt at striking a balance
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between humanitarian concerns, domestic
political considerations and foreign policy.
In comparison, in the late 2000s, public disquiet
in Australia over the arrival of tens of thousands
of asylum seekers, many of them Tamils, meant
that domestic political considerations weighed
differently, and heavily, on the Australian
government’s refugee policies (Kelly 2014).
In the intervening period, the number of asylum
seekers reaching Australia by boat had
increased markedly (although far below the
number arriving in many other countries). The
Sri Lankans were among more than 44,000
people who sailed to Australia to claim
protection during the years 2009 to 2013
(Phillips 2014).
While immigration management in
Australia has long involved security measures
—with visitors checked against warning lists
and migrants and temporary residents
subjected to health, police and character
checks—in the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’
environment, the irregular maritime arrival of
asylum seekers was framed in Australian
political debate as a national security concern.
Prime Minister Rudd’s attempt to unwind
restrictive policies on unauthorised boat
arrivals was seen by many as having
contributed to the arrival of 61 boats (carrying
2850 people) during 2009, and almost 7000
arrivals in 2010 (Kelly 2014). The politics of
so-called border protection became framed as
a test of leadership, and it was in this context
that successive Australian governments sought
to enlist Sri Lanka’s help in preventing the
departure of both Tamil and Sinhalese, despite
the fact that it went against the international
tide of concern over the Rajapaksa
government’s poor human rights record.
As many as 40,000 Sri Lankan civilians,
mostly Tamils, are believed to have died in
the months before the crushing defeat of the
Tamil Tigers at the hands of the Sri Lankan
military (United Nations 2011; PIAC 2014).
But not long after assuming office in January
2015, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister, Ranil
Wickremesinghe of the United National Party,
part of the Sirisena government, claimed in an
interview with the Australian media that the
Australian government’s silence on alleged
human rights abuses was the price it paid to
secure cooperation from the former
government of Mahinda Rajapaksa on
stopping asylum-seeker boats (Hodge 2015).
At the close of the war in 2009, when
200,000 Tamil civilians were reportedly held
in forced internment in Sri Lanka (United
Nations 2011), the Australian Labor
government ‘announced an $11 million aid
package for Colombo and a memorandum of
understanding on “legal co-operation on
people-smuggling” ’ (Hodge 2014). In 2013,
when Canada, Mauritius and India boycotted
the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting in Colombo because of alleged human
rights abuses against Tamils, Australia’s the
Coalition government defended the Rajapaksa
government and gave a gift of two navy patrol
boats to the Sri Lankan coast guard to assist
them in preventing asylum seekers from
departing the country (Hodge 2014). In 2014,
Australia declined to co-sponsor a UN Human
Rights Council resolution for an international
inquiry into alleged war crimes committed in
Sri Lanka during the closing stages of the
conflict (Australia. Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade 2014).
Second, by the time the war ended, the
LTTE was considered a proscribed terrorist
organisation by governments in more than 30
countries around the world, although it was
not proscribed in Australia (Nautilus Institute
for Security and Sustainability 2007). LTTE
assassinations of Sinhalese civilians and rival
Tamils, along with other terrorist activities,
had reduced international support for the cause
of a Tamil homeland, despite the fact that the
terrorism of the Tamil Tigers was matched by
the terrorism of the Sri Lankan military (Weiss
2012). Weiss has argued that in the eyes of the
international community, the Sri Lankan
government successfully framed the war’s
end as a victory over terrorism (Weiss 2012;
United Nations Human Rights Council
Resolution S-11/1, 2009).
While the international community’s
perception of the civil war was eventually
revised and the United Nations Human Rights
Council came to support an inquiry into human
rights violations in Sri Lanka (United Nations
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Human Rights Council Resolution 25/1,
2014), as previously stated, Australia declined
to co-sponsor this initiative. According to
Sentas, the Tamil community in Australia
was ‘criminalised as suspect’ towards the end
of the war and subject to ‘widespread informal
questioning’ or harassment by police, based on
intelligence provided by Sri Lankan authorities
(Sentas 2010). Tamil asylum seekers fleeing to
Australia were suspected of having links to the
LTTE, an idea reportedly fuelled by
information provided to Australian authorities
from officials in Sri Lanka (Neighbour 2010).
As a result of these heightened security
measures, a number of Sri Lankan asylum
seekers and refugees have been subject to
indefinite immigration detention in Australia
(Kaldor Centre 2016b).
Today, Sri Lankans continue to seek asylum
in Australia in small numbers and in larger
numbers around the world (UNHCR 2016).
While they constituted the second highest
group of asylum claimants in Australia in
2012–13, the recognition rate was very low,
at 11.6 per cent (DIAC 2013). In July 2013,
the Rudd government announced that asylum
seekers arriving by boat would not be resettled
in Australia. Between this point and December
2013, once the Abbott government had fully
implemented a ‘turn back the boats’ policy,
Sri Lankans (and asylum seekers of other
nationalities) who made the maritime journey
were transferred to offshore detention on
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, or
Nauru. Since late 2013, most asylum seekers
attempting to reach Australia by boat have
been intercepted at sea and turned around. At
the time of writing, it is believed that
Australian officials had transferred at least five
boatloads of suspected asylum seekers to the
custody of Sri Lankan authorities, and little is
known about their fate upon return (SBS
2016; Kaldor Centre 2016a). Another boatload
of 157 Sri Lankans was held by Australian
authorities at sea for 4 weeks in mid-2014,
before being transferred into Australia’s
offshore immigration detention system (Kaldor
Centre 2016b).
Australia’s current policies may prevent Sri
Lankan asylum seekers from reaching
Australia, but they do not negate the
protection needs of those individuals who
are fleeing persecution nor do they provide
an alternative, orderly pathway to safety. As
a result, since the end of the civil war, some
scholars and practitioners have called for the
Australian government to set up ‘an
emergency quota’ for Sri Lankans seeking
protection (Jupp 2012) or to consider utilising
existing migration channels—such as skilled
or family reunion visas—much as it did in
the aftermath of the July 1983 violence.
Others have called for the Australian
government to expand its intake under the
existing In-Country (sub-class 201) visa and
under the humanitarian program more
generally (Douglas et al. 2014; Australian
Human Rights Commission 2016). This is
because currently, less than 1 per cent of
entrants to Australia each year arrive under
the 201 visa, and while the Global Special
Humanitarian Program comprises a large
proportion of Australia’s annual humanitarian
intake, at around 5000 people per year,
demand for more places is reportedly high
(Australian Human Rights Commission
2016). Studies in other contexts have found
that the decision by a resettling state to offer
in-country processing requires political will
(Hein & de Donato 2012). While the in-
country SHP in Sri Lanka is a small-scale
example of this model of processing, it
suggests that Australia can provide humane
and orderly access to protection in a way that
carefully manages both domestic political and
foreign policy considerations.
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